The Orwellian Potential of Ethical Warrants
And other comments on theories and models for classification systems, designs and applications.
Introduction
My regular readers know that I am in graduate school for information science. What follows are two short essays1 assigned in a class called Information Organization. The first essay addresses the proposed question:
Why would the attempt to represent all knowledge (or all knowledge of a single, broad domain, such as the realm of living things) within a single hierarchy be so unfeasible and/or impracticable as to drive Linnaeus mad?
For context, Carl Linnaeus was an 18th century botanist, and he is considered the father of taxonomy. According to Fowles (see references below), Linnaeus went insane because trying to classify all living things was like navigating a labyrinth with changing paths and walls.
The second essay is a response to a classmate’s essay on the above question. It is not necessary to reproduce the classmate’s essay here.
Finally, I offer some concluding thoughts and clarifications not included in the original essays due to word count limitations. References for both essays have been combined and moved to the very end of this compilation.
Why Did Linnaeus Go Mad?
What drove Linnaeus mad? Being as he lived and died in the 18th century, we can rule out exposure to the works of Mai (2010) and Bullard (2017) as the cause of his insanity. That’s not to say we can’t glean something useful from these scholars. Indeed, Ballard argues that objectivity of classification may be impossible but admits the point is contested (2017, p. 77). I would modify that to read, “objectivity is difficult.” In either case, Linnaeus’ attempt to classify all living things is a steep hill - if not an impossibly sheer cliff - to climb. Efforts of the mind can have lasting effects on the brain; the present author vaguely recalls a story in which Rene Descartes was sick for days trying to determine whether he existed or not (though the story may be apocryphal).
Mai (2010) proceeds under the idea that reality is not knowable (p. 628). Once again, I would modify this statement with the qualifier “difficult.” In fact, the goal of science is to objectively know reality, and it has served us well thus far. Whether difficult or impossible, Linnaeus was attempting an extraordinarily maddening task in trying to organize all knowledge of living things into a single hierarchy. The task evidently took its toll.
Mai (2010) also points out that it is not possible to create a classification system that will “satisfy everyone, everywhere” (p. 636). While I question the conclusions Mai extrapolates from this fact, it does seem to be a fact. Was Linnaeus trying to craft such a classification system? Was he chasing unicorns?
There is a better explanation. Jacob (2004) suggests that without categories we would perceive every single object uniquely, and he continues to say that categorization “simplifies the individual’s experience of the environment” (p. 518). Categories and classifications are not the same (Jacob, 2004, p. 516), but the principle at work here is: there is too much of the world and not enough of us (or, in this case, Linnaeus). It may be that, in attempting to classify all living things, Linnaeus was at once attempting to experience them all uniquely, and that is a weight the human cognitive scaffolding is not rated for. Jacob (2004) also tells us that classification reduces cognitive load (p. 530). That may be true, but Linnaeus didn't have the benefit of (a good) one. Indeed, that’s why he was trying to invent it.
Fowles’ (1969) description of the labyrinth with changing walls is poignant (p. 49), but, another literary figure put it more plainly: “The most merciful thing in the world, I think, is the inability of the human mind to correlate all its contents” and if attempted we “shall either go mad from the revelation or flee from the deadly light into the peace and safety of a new dark age” (Lovecraft, 19822, p. 72).
Response to Classmate’s Essay
An excellent point is raised by noting that an entity may evolve into or out of different categories. That evolution may be biological, although that would take millions of years and therefore not a concern for us or Linnaeus. More applicable are the changing contexts and additional knowledge about the entity. We know from Jacob (2004) that categories are context dependent.
Mai (2010) suggests that classifications cannot be “neutral, unbiased and which will satisfy everyone, everywhere” (p. 636). I am not so sure about the first two claims, but certainly the third is correct. That lends credence to [classmate’s] claim that “what one individual considers essential cannot be assumed as universal.”
Mai’s (2010) recommendations that classification systems should be transparent and involve their users’ cooperation are sound. Unfortunately, truth is objective, and reality is knowable. They are not social constructs and classification theories ought not to become relativistic. If a classification theory did become relativistic, the system would reduce its effectiveness and usability, frustrate the user and cause distrust - the very thing Mai is trying to fix.
Bullard (2017) suggests that an ethical warrant3 is not a warrant but an appeal to apply morality to information designs and systems. This means placing the control of moral arbitration into the hands of institutions, namely the government. I cannot imagine a worse idea; the implications are Orwellian.
Conclusion
I decided to publish these essays here because the work of Mai and Bullard troubled me. In the case of the former, I vehemently disagree that truth and knowledge are social constructs (p. 639) or that reality is not knowable (p. 628). Mai also states on page 633 that, “... classifications are epistemological statements; they do say something about the world, and they embed politics, religion, and morality.” This statement seems to fall under the idea that everything is political, which has been used to justify political indoctrination in the classroom, film, newspapers and more.
Bullard is even more disturbing. His Orwellian recommendation comes on page 81: an ethical warrant is “less a material for classification design than a position on the responsibility of the designer in applying any type of warrant.” He continues, “sensitivity to ethical concerns such as political, religious, cultural, gender, and language representation is a vital part of classification design.”
In other words, an ethical warrant is not about classification design but about the moral responsibility of the designers with regard to politics, etc. If those designers are part of a government institution, such as a public library, that would invite the government to tell the public what is right and righteous. Bullard provides real-world evidence of this, too. He visited a “fanwork repository” (pp. 82-87) in which the question arose: should the repository use the popular tag “gypsy” or a less offensive term? The designers decided against the use of “gypsy.” However, Bullard writes:
Despite the new tag being privileged through the autocomplete functionality, it is only used once, while variations of the “gypsy” tag are used another six times. The change was not justified according to user warrant4, and this is confirmed when users do not adopt the new terminology. The change was based on ethical warrant, with a goal of using respectful, non-discriminatory language in the place of a popular slur. [Emphasis added; p. 86]
In other words, because the designers decided that they were moral arbitrators and the use of the word “gypsy” was immoral, another term was used despite users' preference for the original term. Let me say that “gypsy” may, indeed, be a slur. It may be terribly offensive and wrong. Still, it is not for the members of the fanwork repository to decide that on behalf of their users. The job of a classification system designer is to create a useful classification system; it is not to police language.
The fanwork repository is an inconsequential example. I admit that. But if Bullard’s ethical warrant is adopted by institutions, the implications are Orwellian.
What do you think?
References
Bullard, J. (2017). Warrant as a means to study classification system design. Journal of Documentation, 73(1), 75-90.
Fowles, J. (1969). The French Lieutenant’s woman. New York, NY: Little, Brown and Company.
Jacob, E. K. (2004). Classification and categorization: A difference that makes a difference. Library Trends, 52(3), 515-540.
Lovecraft, H. P. (1982). The best of H. P. Lovecraft: Bloodcurdling tales of horror and the macabre. Del Rey.
Mai, J. E. (2010). Classification in a social world: bias and trust. Journal of Documentation, 66(5), 627-642.
The essays were one assignment. I received a near perfect score, 79/80.
The title and copyright pages of this book didn’t provide enough information to properly cite the source in APA style. Fortunately, Lovecraft’s work is widely available and easily found. If you’re wondering, the quote comes from “The Call of Cthulhu” originally published in Weird Tales February 1928.
A warrant is the justification for a decision made by a cataloger or indexer.
I.e., for the benefit of the user.